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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, many companies have emphasized adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly 
press releases. While managers use different names to describe these non-standard earnings metrics, the 
financial press frequently refers to them as “pro forma” earnings.  Managers and other advocates of pro 
forma reporting argue that these disclosures provide a clearer picture of companies’ core earnings. On the 
other hand, regulators, policymakers, and the financial press often allege that managers' pro forma 
earnings disclosures are opportunistic attempts to mislead investors. Recent evidence suggests that while 
many pro forma earnings disclosures are altruistically motivated, some may represent managers’ attempts 
to portray overly-optimistic financial performance.  If this is the case, less-wealthy, less-sophisticated, 
individual investors are arguably the most at risk of being misled. Consequently, this study investigates 
who trades on pro forma earnings information. Our intraday investigation of transactions around earnings 
announcements containing pro forma earnings information reveals that less-sophisticated investors’ 
announcement-period abnormal trading is significantly positively associated with the magnitude and 
direction of the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings. In contrast, we find no association between 
sophisticated investors’ trading and manager-reported pro forma information. Overall, our analyses and 
numerous robustness tests suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings 
information is populated predominantly by less-sophisticated individual investors. This evidence is 
particularly relevant to standard setters and regulators given that Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 and subsequent SEC regulations are specifically designed to protect ordinary investors from 
misleading pro forma information.  
 
Keywords:   Pro forma earnings; corporate disclosure; The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; SEC regulations 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The managerial practice in recent years of reporting a non-standard, alternative profitability 
measure in the same press release with the audited earnings number has generated substantial controversy 
and debate. These alternative profitability metrics (popularly known as “pro forma” earnings) are GAAP 
earnings adjusted for items that managers deem to be transitory or non-representative of future earnings 
(Weil, 2001).1 Managers defend this practice by asserting that pro forma earnings figures provide 
stakeholders a more accurate assessment of sustainable operating performance (i.e., a better measure of core 
earnings) than do standard GAAP earnings figures (Bray, 2001).  On the other hand, policymakers, 
regulators, and the financial press often allege that pro forma earnings are incomplete, inaccurate, and 
misleading to investors (Derby, 2001; Dreman, 2001; Elstein, 2001). This debate highlights the possibility 
that, while some pro forma reports are altruistically motivated, others may represent managers’ attempts to 
divert stakeholders’ attention from poor operating performance by excluding bad news from GAAP 
earnings.2 
Recent research examining market reactions to earnings announcements containing pro forma 
information provides evidence that investors often pay more attention to management-adjusted pro forma 
earnings numbers than to audited GAAP earnings figures (Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Larson, 
2003, hereafter BBCL; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). Further, two recent experimental studies 
(Frederickson and Miller, 2004; Elliott, 2006) provide evidence that less-sophisticated investors are more 
likely to rely on pro forma information than more-sophisticated investors. Finally, a small but growing 
stream of research provides evidence that pro forma earnings information may be misleading to investors. 
                                                 
1 Managers do not always label their adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers as “pro forma” income. Press releases often 
describe adjusted-GAAP earnings figures using terms such as cash earnings, core earnings, adjusted earnings, 
earnings excluding certain items, or earnings before certain items. Wallace (2002) provides an exhaustive list of 
common nomenclatures managers use to label their adjusted-GAAP earnings metrics. While our sample includes all 
of the various adjusted-GAAP earnings labels described by Wallace (2002), we refer to them throughout the paper 
using the terms “pro forma” or “adjusted-GAAP” earnings for ease of exposition.  
2 Prior research provides a more detailed discussion of this debate (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004; and Elliott, 2006, among others).  While we only discuss this issue briefly, we emphasize that there 
has been considerable deliberation on both sides of the matter, and we believe both positions have merit. It is likely 
that managers often present pro forma earnings with a legitimate incentive to provide a clearer picture of recurring 
earnings. For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find evidence that some of their pro forma disclosures contain 
adjustments where managers voluntarily exclude one-time gains. On the other hand, Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto’s 
(2005) evidence suggests that managers strategically emphasize the earnings metric that “spins” the more favorable 
story. 
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For example, Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2005) provide evidence that managers strategically emphasize 
pro forma earnings metrics in earnings press releases, while Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003) argue 
that investors are misled because they fail to understand that certain expenses excluded from analysts’ 
“street earnings” are actually associated with lower levels of future firm performance.3 Collectively, this 
body of evidence suggests that (1) investors pay attention to pro forma earnings information, (2) more- and 
less-sophisticated investors likely process this information differently, and (3) some adjusted-GAAP 
disclosures may be misleading to investors. Consequently, this study investigates who trades on pro forma 
earnings information—sophisticated investors (e.g., institutions), less-sophisticated individual investors, or 
both. Since individual investors with a limited ability to access and process information are most at risk of 
being misled, our investigation is timely and relevant given the recent concern of legislators and regulators 
that pro forma information may mislead investors.   
We use detailed transactions data from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database to examine investor 
trading responses around 5,736 quarterly earnings press releases containing voluntarily disclosed pro forma 
earnings numbers issued between January 1998 and December 2003. Following prior research (e.g., 
Cready, 1988; Lee, 1992; Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000; Bhattacharya, 2001; Bushee, Matsumoto, Miller, 
2003), we use trade size to distinguish larger, sophisticated, and well-informed investors from smaller, less-
sophisticated, and less-informed investors. We rely on the Lee-Ready algorithm to infer trade direction (buy 
versus sell) from intraday transactions data to allow us to examine net buying (i.e., buy minus sell) activities 
of more- versus less-sophisticated investors around earnings press releases containing pro forma earnings 
information (e.g., Lee and Ready, 1991). 
The results suggest that the market reaction to pro forma earnings information is almost exclusively 
attributable to less-sophisticated investors. The results indicate that less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal 
net-buying activities are significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of the forecast 
error based on pro forma earnings (i.e., managers’ pro forma income number minus the market’s earnings 
                                                 
3 While this study focuses on manager-adjusted earnings numbers, prior research investigates adjusted-GAAP 
earnings numbers disclosed by managers as well as analysts. Gu and Chen (2004) introduce a useful convention by 
labeling manager-adjusted earnings figures voluntarily reported in earnings press releases as “pro forma” earnings, 
and analyst-adjusted earnings numbers reported by forecast tracking services as “street” earnings. Following Gu and 
Chen, we report management-reported numbers as “pro forma,” or “adjusted-GAAP” earnings and the numbers 
published by forecast data providers as “street” earnings.  
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expectation). In other words, we find that the higher (lower) the pro forma forecast error, the higher (lower) 
the less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-buying activities, suggesting that these investors buy and sell 
shares based on information in pro forma earnings. In addition, less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-
buying activities are more highly associated with the pro forma forecast error than with the GAAP 
operating earnings forecast error (i.e., the GAAP operating EPS figure minus the market’s earnings 
expectation). We also find that less-sophisticated investors’ trading activities are significantly positively 
associated with the I/B/E/S forecast error (i.e., the actual EPS “street earnings” figure published by I/B/E/S 
minus the market’s earnings expectation). However, the pro forma forecast error appears to be 
incrementally informative (after controlling for both GAAP operating earnings and I/B/E/S actual earnings 
forecast errors) in explaining the trading activities of less-sophisticated investors.4 In sharp contrast, more-
sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-buying activities are not associated with forecast errors based on pro 
forma or GAAP operating earnings. We, however, find some evidence that more-sophisticated investors’ 
abnormal trading activities are significantly positively associated with the I/B/E/S forecast error.  Taken 
together, these results suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings information 
is likely to be disproportionately populated by less-sophisticated investors.  
A potential caveat in interpreting results reported in this literature arises from the classic errors-in-
variables problem (e.g., Bradshaw, 2003; BBCL, 2003; Berger, 2005). This problem arises because forecast 
tracking services, such as I/B/E/S, attempt to exclude the same items from their “street” earnings number 
that analysts exclude from their forecasts.  Thus, the “street” forecast error generally has less measurement 
error than forecast errors computed by subtracting the mean analysts’ forecast from GAAP operating 
earnings or manager-adjusted pro forma earnings. In order to ensure that our results are not attributable to 
measurement error, we follow Gu and Chen (2004) in disaggregating the earnings number into components 
and investigating managers’ incremental adjustments beyond those made by analysts.  This disaggregation 
allows us to operationalize an alternative specification that circumvents the errors-in-variables problem.5 
Consistent with our main results, we find that after controlling for the I/B/E/S forecast error (the most 
                                                 
4 Likewise, the I/B/E/S forecast error is significantly incrementally informative (after controlling for both the GAAP 
operating earnings and pro forma forecast errors) in explaining less-sophisticated investors’ trading activities. 
5 Marques (2006) uses a similar decomposition of earnings components. We discuss the Gu and Chen (2004) 
framework and this alternative specification in our sensitivity analyses.   
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accurate proxy for the earnings surprise), less-sophisticated investors’ (but not more-sophisticated 
investors’) abnormal net-buying activities are positively associated with managers’ incremental earnings 
adjustments. 
Our evidence that less-informed, less-sophisticated investors trade on pro forma earnings 
information while more-sophisticated investors do not has important implications for regulators—whose 
objectives include the protection of ordinary investors from potentially inaccurate and misleading 
information and the leveling of the informational playing field.6 Specifically, Section 401(b) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, SOX) directs the SEC to issue regulations to ensure that pro forma 
financials are not misleading to ordinary investors. The SEC subsequently issued Regulation G in January 
of 2003 to implement the provisions of the Act. Our evidence highlights the importance of continued 
monitoring of the effectiveness of Regulation G and assessing the need for additional or alternative 
regulatory actions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and the research 
questions. Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection criteria. Section 4 explains the research 
design and the empirical proxies. Section 5 discusses the results, and finally Section 6 provides concluding 
remarks.  
II. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The rapid proliferation of pro forma financial disclosures in recent years has fueled an intense 
debate among supporters and critics of pro forma reporting. On the one hand, managers who report pro 
forma earnings numbers claim that pro forma earnings represent an improved metric for assessing future 
cash flows and firm value since pro forma earnings numbers exclude transitory and non-cash items from 
GAAP earnings (e.g., Bray, 2001 and Weil, 2001). Some practitioners concur with managers’ claim that 
removing non-cash and non-recurring items enhances comparability in time-series measures because the 
GAAP measure includes items such as restructuring charges and gains and losses on the sale of assets, 
                                                 
6 One of the SEC’s primary missions is to mandate disclosures that reduce the extent to which some investors are at 
an informational disadvantage relative to others (Foster, 1986, 40; Hand and Beatty, 1992). The AICPA study group 
(AICPA, 1973, 17) on the Objective of Financial Statements notes, “An objective of financial statements is to serve 
primarily those users who have limited authority, ability or resources to obtain information.” 
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which have little implication for future earnings (Halsey and Soybel, 2002). Some equity analysts also 
echo this sentiment as one analyst comments that the reported GAAP figure is usually an ‘accounting 
fiction’ because it frequently includes non-recurring items and other accrual accounting distortions 
(MacDonald, 1999). BBCL (2003) document instances where managers exclude one-time gains which 
results in a pro forma number that is lower than the GAAP number. These scenarios represent a 
conservative estimate of future profitability. Such examples suggest that some pro forma reports are 
altruistically motivated to disclose a clearer picture of core earnings.  Richard Bernstein, chief U.S. 
strategist for Merrill Lynch & Co. summarizes the popularity of pro forma reporting as follows, “But for 
all the now-obvious shortcomings, pro forma reporting remains big in the tech world” (Sender, 2002).   
Legislators, regulators, and the financial press, on the other hand, have alleged that managers 
opportunistically and selectively exclude income statement items from audited GAAP earnings in order to 
portray the company in the most favorable light possible (Derby, 2001; Dreman, 2001; Elstein, 2001; 
Liesman and Weil, 2001a, 2001b). Critics of pro forma reporting are skeptical of managers’ claims that 
their adjusted earnings metrics provide a clearer picture of sustainable “core earnings”. Former SEC 
Chairman Harvey Pitt commented, “Without appropriate disclosure, no investor—certainly not any 
ordinary investor—can read these (pro forma financials) in a way that's useful. An investor can't know 
what's been left out, why it's left out, or how it compares with other companies' earnings” (Levinsohn 
2002). The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has also expressed concern that the 
proliferation of pro forma earnings is undermining the quality of financial reporting (FASB, 2002). In his 
2002 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, Warren Buffett warned, “companies issuing such (pro 
forma) numbers want you to unthinkingly accept concepts that are dangerously flawed” (Byrnes and 
Derhovanesian, 2002). Lawrence Summers of the U.S. Treasury advises investors not to pay attention to 
pro forma figures but to rely on audited GAAP earnings instead (Wessel, 2002). Some academics also 
share this concern. D’Avolio, Gildor and Shleifer (2002) argue that even though GAAP numbers may not 
always provide economically superior information, failure to follow these standards is likely to lead to 
inefficient overall outcomes as the ability of regulators to enforce disclosure standards deteriorates.     
Despite the skepticism expressed by standard setters, regulators and legislators, recent research 
finds evidence that investors pay attention to various adjusted-GAAP earnings figures. Bradshaw and 
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Sloan (2002) and Brown and Sivakumar (2003) report that investors attach more weight to street earnings 
figures published by a major analyst forecast tracking service (I/B/E/S) than to GAAP earnings numbers. 
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) provide evidence that manager-reported pro forma income has incremental 
information content over GAAP earnings. BBCL (2003) report that investors not only pay attention to 
manager-adjusted pro forma earnings, but they focus on pro forma earnings significantly more than GAAP 
operating earnings (before special items). These results suggest that at least some investors rely on 
adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers published by managers. 
Two recent experimental studies find evidence that less-sophisticated investors may interpret pro 
forma earnings information differently from sophisticated, professional investors.  Frederickson and 
Miller (2004) find that less-sophisticated investors (MBA students) predict higher future stock prices than 
more-sophisticated investors (security analysts) when they see a press release containing a pro forma 
earnings number that exceeds the GAAP earnings figure. Elliott (2006) reports that when the pro forma 
earnings number is emphasized in the press release relative to the GAAP earnings number, less-
sophisticated investors (MBA students) increase their expectations about future earnings, while more-
sophisticated investors’ (analysts) judgments are unaffected by this manipulation. Collectively, these 
results suggest that (1) investors pay attention to pro forma numbers, and (2) less-sophisticated, less-
informed individual investors are likely to process pro forma earnings information differently from better-
informed professional investors.  
Several recent studies suggest that pro forma earnings information may be misleading to 
investors. Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003) find that expenses excluded from analysts’ “street 
earnings” have implications for future cash flows. They also find that investors fail to fully understand the 
implications of these exclusions for future firm performance, and a trading strategy based on the excluded 
expenses generates significant abnormal returns in the future periods even after controlling for known risk 
proxies. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) also provide preliminary evidence that investors misprice 
management-issued pro forma numbers. While Johnson and Swartz (2005) find some evidence that “pro 
forma” firms are systematically priced higher than “non-pro-forma” firms, they fail to find consistent 
evidence indicating that investors are misled by pro forma earnings information.  Finally, Bowen, Davis, 
and Matsumoto’s (2005) results suggest that managers’ placement of pro forma versus GAAP earnings 
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metrics in earnings press releases is opportunistically motivated and focuses on the metric that “spins” the 
more favorable story.    
Given preliminary evidence that pro forma earnings may be misleading, the investors who are 
clearly most at risk of being misled are the less-wealthy, individual class of investors because extant 
research indicates that these investors lack the necessary sophistication and experience to fully understand 
the precision and reliability of their information set.7  Regulators and legislators are particularly concerned 
that pro forma disclosures may be misleading to ordinary investors. The U.S. Congress has expressed 
serious concern that inaccurate or misleading corporate disclosures may hurt the less-sophisticated 
investors (Burns, 2001). Therefore, a thorough investigation of who trades on pro forma earnings 
information is particularly timely and relevant. Consequently, this study examines investor trading 
responses around pro forma earnings announcement dates. Specifically, the study investigates the 
following research questions: 
(1) Who trades on pro forma earnings information: less-sophisticated investors, more-
sophisticated investors, or both? 
(2) To what extent do more-and less-sophisticated investors trade incrementally on the earnings 
surprise based on pro forma earnings vis-à-vis the surprise based on GAAP operating earnings 
or the earnings figure published by I/B/E/S? 
 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
 We searched the PR Newswire and Business Wire on LexisNexis for the years 1998-2003 to 
collect a comprehensive sample of pro forma press releases. A typical pro forma press release contains the 
GAAP earnings per share (EPS) figure, a pro forma earnings number (an adjusted-GAAP earnings 
measure voluntarily disclosed by managers) for the current quarter, and various other details management 
                                                 
7 In an experimental setting, Bloomfield et al. (1999) find that less-sophisticated investors do not fully understand the 
limitations of their information set, and trade aggressively to systematically transfer wealth to sophisticated 
investors. Barber and Odean (1999, 2000) conclude after analyzing proprietary brokerage data that individual 
investors make suboptimal trading decisions and earn returns far below the market average due to their inability to 
assess the limitations of their information sets. Hirshleifer and Hong (2003) develop a stylized analytical framework 
to model sophisticated and naïve investors’ interactions in the context of pro forma disclosure and show that naïve 
investors do not appropriately discount non-standard pro forma information and consequently overvalue the firm, 
while sophisticated investors do not. Stock price, as a weighted average of beliefs, appears high to sophisticated 
investors prompting them to sell and appears low to naïve investors prompting them to buy. Consequently, a wealth 
transfer takes place between the two groups.       
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deems to be relevant. We include earnings announcements in which the company discloses a pro forma 
number that differs from the “bottom line” GAAP diluted EPS number disclosed in the same press release. 
Our original search uses the keywords “pro forma,” “pro-forma,” and “proforma” and retrieves 50,011 
press releases. However, companies often use other nomenclatures to describe their adjusted-GAAP 
earnings figures. Wallace (2002) performs a detailed categorization of adjusted-GAAP earnings 
nomenclatures used by companies. Based on Wallace’s (2002) list of adjusted-GAAP earnings 
nomenclatures, we further search LexisNexis using the following expanded search string:  “earnings 
excluding,” “net income excluding,” “adjusted net income,” “adjusted loss,” “cash earnings,” “earnings 
before,” “free cash flow,” “normalized EPS,” “normalized earnings,” “recurring earnings,” “distributable 
cash flow,” “GAAP one-time adjusted,” “GAAP adjusted,” “cash loss,” AND NOT  “pro forma,” “pro-
forma,” or “proforma.”8  This expanded search yields an additional 33,373 hits bringing the grand total to 
83,384 potential press releases.  After carefully reading each press release, we find that 17,511 
announcements contain actual quarterly pro forma earnings announcements. The other 65,873 press 
releases from the initial searches refer to such things as current period pro forma revenues, forward-
looking pro forma forecasts, earnings after adding in results from firms acquired or merged in the current 
period, or statements referring to prior period pro forma earnings.  
 We require firm-quarter observations to have data available in the Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S, and 
TAQ databases in order to perform our empirical analyses. These requirements result in a final sample of 
5,736 announcements of 2,209 unique firms from January 1998 to December 2003. We collect actual pro 
forma announcement time stamps from Bloomberg.  If a company announces pro forma earnings during 
non-trading hours (i.e., between 4:30 PM and 9:30 AM), we set the time of the announcement to 9:30 AM 
the next trading day. We obtain detailed intraday transactions data from the TAQ database. TAQ reports 
all trades and quotes originating from the NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq, or the regional exchanges. For each 
trade, TAQ provides the time of the transaction to the nearest second, price, volume, and a trade condition 
code. Except for the opening trade of each day, we include all trades with a condition code of “regular 
                                                 
8 Note that we do not include EBIT or EBITDA since they are commonly reported as standard steps in the income 
statement.  Moreover, these figures were often reported on a per share basis long before the pro forma reporting trend 
began in the late-1990s. 
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sale” occurring between 9:30 AM and 4:30 PM Eastern Standard Time (EST) in our tests.9  We exclude 
the opening trade because it is often the sum of multiple orders and including it could add noise to our 
measures (Lee and Ready, 1991; Lee, 1992). However, our results are almost identical (not tabulated) 
when we include the opening trade in our analyses. We only include trades with a “regular sales” 
condition code because these trades result from continuous two-sided auctions involving market orders, 
limit orders, and buys and sells against the specialists’ inventories. This is not the case when the condition 
code indicates something other than a “regular sale” (e.g., large block trades or stopped orders).  
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL PROXIES 
Observation Intervals 
We examine three trading days surrounding the pro forma announcement date:  day -1, day 0, and 
day +1.10  In our analysis a “trading day” is comprised of seven consecutive trading hours (since a normal 
trading day from 9:30 AM to 4:30 PM is seven hours long). Day 0, the day of the earnings announcement 
containing a pro forma earnings figure, begins at the time of the press release and continues for the next 
seven hours during which equity markets are open. Since our trading days are defined with respect to the 
timing of the earnings press release, they generally do not correspond to a typical day of trade beginning at 
9:30 AM and ending at 4:30 PM EST, but instead span seven hours of trading during two different 
calendar days.  
Proxy for Investor Sophistication and Wealth 
Prior research suggests that, on average, wealthier, more-sophisticated, professional investors 
(like institutions) are likely to make larger trades, while less-wealthy and less-sophisticated investors 
(primarily individuals) are likely to make smaller trades (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 1987; Hasbrouck, 1988, 
1991; Chan and Lakonishok, 1993; Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000).  Therefore, several prior studies (e.g., 
Cready, 1988; Cready and Mynatt, 1991; Lee, 1992; and Bhattacharya 2001), use trade size to 
differentiate wealthy, sophisticated investors from less-wealthy, less-sophisticated investors.  Existing 
                                                 
9 Although NYSE and AMEX close at 4:00 PM EST, we allow an extra thirty minutes to pick up trades originating 
on the regional exchanges or trades reported late (e.g., Lee and Ready, 1991; Lee, 1992; Bhattacharya, 2001). 
10 We extend our examination up to five trading days before the earnings announcement date (i.e., one full week of 
trading prior to the earnings announcement). However, we detect no significant abnormal trading activities by more- 
or less-sophisticated investors before day -1. 
 10
research also suggests that sophisticated, informed investors may not always submit large orders. Kyle’s 
(1985) model shows that rational, informed investors often have an incentive to engage in medium-sized 
trades to disguise their private information. Empirical research also provides support for this conjecture 
(e.g., Cornell and Sirri, 1992; Meulbroek, 1992; Barclay and Warner, 1993). Sophisticated institutional 
investors, however, are unlikely to engage in very small trades as it may significantly reduce their trading 
profits for the following reasons. First, breaking a large order into numerous small orders significantly 
increases direct transaction costs. Second, a series of small orders from one account could prompt the 
specialist to increase the spread. Finally, breaking a large order into smaller parts would require more time 
to move all of the desired shares, thereby increasing the chance that other arbitrageurs would enter the 
market, further eroding trading profits. Consequently, small trades are likely to capture primarily 
individual trading activity, while medium and/or large trades are likely to capture primarily sophisticated 
institutional trading activity. Chakravarty’s (2001) evidence from detailed audit trail data supports this 
conjecture. He finds that significant institutional trading activity takes place in medium-sized trades, while 
vast majority of individual trading activity takes place in really small trade sizes below 500 shares. 
Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003) provide recent empirical evidence confirming Chakravarty’s 
conclusions. Consequently, we investigate small trades to capture the activities of relatively less-informed 
and less-sophisticated individual investors and we examine medium and large trades to capture the 
activities of sophisticated, primarily institutional investors.     
Our main analyses classify trades of $7,000 or less as small trades, trades between $7,000 and 
$50,000 as medium-sized trades, and trades over $50,000 as large trades. We also repeat all analyses (not 
tabulated) using several alternative cutoff schemes to ensure that our results are not sensitive to specific 
cutoff points. We use transactions of $5,000 or less, and less than $10,000 as alternative cutoff schemes 
for classifying small trades. We classify transactions between $10,000 and $50,000, and transactions 
between $10,000 and $100,000 as alternative cutoff points for medium trades. We use trades sizes of 
greater than or equal to $40,000 and greater than or equal to $100,000 to identify large trades. Finally, in 
order to examine extremely large orders that could only be submitted by institutions or extremely wealthy 
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individuals, we examine a third alternative cutoff of $250,000 or more for classifying large trades. All our 
results are qualitatively similar when we use these various alternative cutoff schemes. 
Figure 1 provides the distributions of the average dollar-value of shares traded11 during each day 
in the announcement window. The purpose of this figure is to provide a snapshot of the activities of small, 
medium and large investors during the announcement period. For example, we find that transactions of 
$10,000 or below (encompassing our various small-investor cutoffs) comprise approximately 29% of total 
dollar-volume on day 0, the earnings announcement day (second chart of Figure 1). Transactions between 
$10,000 and $50,000 (generally capturing medium-investor activities) also comprise approximately 29% 
of the total dollar-volume on the day of the announcement. Finally, transactions of $50,000 or above (our 
large investor cutoff) comprise about 42% of raw dollar-volume on the announcement day. We observe 
similar distributional characteristics on the day before (day -1) and the day after (day +1) the earnings 
announcement.  Since our large-investor (medium-investor) cutoff captures approximately 46% (24%) of 
the daily announcement period raw dollar-volume during the three-day announcement window, we 
conclude that our sample does not consist primarily of smaller, thinly traded firms in whose stocks large 
investors seldom trade.    
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Method and Variable Definitions 
As previously mentioned, we hand-collect adjusted-GAAP diluted earnings per share numbers 
disclosed by managers in their earnings press releases and label them as EPSPROFORMA. We benchmark 
investor reactions to EPSPROFORMA with diluted earnings per share from operations (EPSGAAP-OP) from 
Compustat.12  This diluted operating EPS figure from Compustat excludes all “special items” and “below-
the-line” items. Several recent studies document that investors pay significant attention to actual EPS figures 
provided by analyst forecast tracking services, such as I/B/E/S (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and 
Sivakumar, 2003; Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman, 2003). Consequently, we examine a third earnings metric 
                                                 
11 Note that this figure illustrates raw dollar-volume, not abnormal dollar-volume. 
12 We begin with Compustat’s basic earnings per share from operations (quarterly data item 177) and multiply this by 
the number of basic shares outstanding (Compustat quarterly data item 15) to get total operating earnings. We then 
divide operating earnings by the number of diluted shares outstanding (Compustat annual data item 171) to obtain 
quarterly diluted earnings per share from operations.  Subsequent to our data collection for this project, we learned 
that Compustat’s latest files contain a quarterly diluted operating EPS number (data item 181). 
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– the actual EPS figure from I/B/E/S (EPSI/B/E/S).13 Thus, our trading analysis complements the BBCL 
(2003) study which investigates price reactions to all three earnings metrics – pro forma EPS, GAAP 
operating EPS, and I/B/E/S actual EPS.    
In order to ascertain the announcement-period investor reaction to new information contained in 
each of the three earnings metrics, we calculate the earnings surprise or forecast error for each metric using 
two different earnings expectations. The first expectation is the mean analysts’ earnings forecast. This 
measure is timely (current) and comprehensive and has been used widely in empirical research as a proxy 
for the unobservable market expectation. However, this measure may produce bias against the forecast error 
based on GAAP operating earnings when it is compared with forecast errors based on I/B/E/S and pro forma 
earnings figures. This bias stems from the fact that I/B/E/S generally excludes the same items from its actual 
EPS figures that the majority of analysts exclude from their forecasts. Further, there is overlap between 
exclusions made by managers and exclusions made by analysts (e.g., BBCL, 2003; Doyle, Lundholm and 
Soliman, 2003). In order to address this concern, we employ a second earnings expectation— GAAP 
operating earnings from the same quarter of the previous year (i.e., the seasonal random-walk earnings 
expectation). Although the seasonal random-walk earnings expectation may alleviate the bias against the 
GAAP operating earnings forecast error, it is a much noisier expectation than the analysts’ consensus 
forecast.14 Thus, we compute three forecast errors (FEPROFORMA, FEGAAP-OP and FEI/B/E/S) by subtracting the 
earnings expectation (measured either by the analysts’ mean forecast or by the seasonal random-walk 
forecast) from the three actual earnings metrics, and scaling this difference by the closing price five days 
before the earnings announcement date, day t-5 (e.g., Christie, 1987).15        
                                                 
13 We collect I/B/E/S actual EPS figures from the unadjusted I/B/E/S Actuals file. We use the unadjusted I/B/E/S 
Actual and Detail files to avoid biases arising from using adjusted I/B/E/S data (e.g., Payne and Thomas, 2003).  
14 Analysts’ forecasts are more comprehensive and precise than random-walk forecasts because security analysts 
have incentives to quickly impound value-relevant predisclosure information in their earnings forecasts (e.g., 
Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 1999). Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski (1987) argue that analysts forecasts 
are more accurate and less noisy than random-walk forecasts because analysts’ forecasts have a contemporaneous 
advantage (i.e., incorporate a variety of other information than just the past earnings stream) as well as a timing 
advantage (i.e., they take into account more recent information).     
15 The mean forecast is calculated for each firm using all forecasts from the unadjusted I/B/E/S Detail file made 
within 90 days prior to the quarterly earnings announcement date. The 90-day restriction ensures that forecasts are 
current. We also repeat all analyses using the median forecast with no change in results. Further, we repeat our 
analyses using forecasts made within 45 or 60 days prior to the earnings announcement date. Shorter pre-
announcement windows of 60 or 45 days ensure that forecasts are more current, but we lose observations as we 
reduce the length of the window (especially when we go to the 45-day window). The main tenor of the results, 
however, is unchanged when we use the shorter pre-announcement windows.  
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In order to examine the reaction of sophisticated versus less-sophisticated investors to various 
earnings surprise metrics, we compute abnormal net order imbalance measures for the small-, medium-, and 
large-investor groups. We calculate small investors’ abnormal net-buy volume (buy volume minus sell 
volume) for firm i on each day during the announcement period (day –1, day 0, or day +1) as the small 
investors’ day t net-buy volume for firm i minus small investors’ average daily non-announcement period 
net-buy volume for firm i, scaled by the average daily non-announcement period total trading volume for 
firm i. We call this measure as SML_NETBUY. Again, all trades of $7,000 or less are classified as small 
trades. The non-announcement period is a two-week period ending exactly one month before the earnings 
announcement date. Thus, SML_NETBUY is an abnormal measure of net-buying activity of small 
investors around earnings announcement dates. A positive value for this measure indicates above-normal 
buying activity by small investors during the event period. For example, when SML_NETBUY is regressed 
on FEPROFORMA, a significantly positive coefficient on FEPROFORMA would indicate that when the pro forma 
forecast error is positive (i.e., good news based on pro forma earnings), small investors’ net-buying activity 
increases, and when the pro forma forecast error is negative (i.e., bad news based on pro forma earnings), 
small investors’ net-buying activity decreases. In other words, a positive and significant coefficient on 
FEPROFORMA would suggest that small investors trade in the direction of the pro forma earnings surprise. We 
compute MED_NETBUY exactly the same way but based on medium-sized trades between $7,000 and 
$50,000. Likewise, we compute LRG_NETBUY based on trades above $50,000. Our main analyses regress 
small, medium, and large abnormal net-buy volume measures separately on FEGAAP-OP, FEPROFORMA, and 
FEI/B/E/S.16        
 We rely on the algorithm developed by Lee and Ready (1991) to classify transactions as buys or 
sells. This algorithm uses a “tick” test to infer trade direction from intraday trades and quotes data 
obtained from the TAQ database and has been used widely in the empirical market microstructure 
                                                 
16 We also repeat our analyses using unsigned abnormal trading volume instead of signed net-buy volume. These 
analyses are less reliable because the use of unsigned trading volume metrics requires that we take the absolute value 
of the forecast error variables. Thus, trading volume analysis ignores valuable information (for example, such 
analysis does not make any qualitative distinction between “good news” or positive forecast error and “bad news” or 
negative forecast error) and introduces noise in the results. Nevertheless, while the unsigned trading volume results 
are weaker, the main tenor of the results remains unchanged.    
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literature.17 A more recent paper by Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) suggests some modifications of the 
original Lee-Ready algorithm to improve its specification. We repeat our analyses (not tabulated) using 
the Ellis et al. (2000) procedure to classify trades as buys and sells, but find no qualitative difference in 
results.        
Prior research suggests that small and large firms have different investor clienteles. Specifically, 
prior studies suggest that individual traders are likely to account for a greater proportion of the trading 
activity of smaller firms, while institutional traders are likely to account for a greater proportion of the 
trading activity of larger firms (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; El-Gazzar, 1998; Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000). 
Consequently, when we regress small, medium, and large investors’ abnormal net-buy volume measures on 
forecast errors based on pro forma earnings, GAAP operating earnings, or I/B/E/S actual earnings, we 
control for firm size in order to ensure that the results are not merely attributable to differences in firm size. 
We use the log of total assets (in millions) at the end of the previous quarter as our control for firm size 
(SIZE).18  Finally, our abnormal net-buy measures control for small, medium, and large investors’ firm-
specific average level of liquidity trading, but they do not control for investors’ trading responses associated 
with market-wide or macroeconomic factors. Therefore, we follow prior research (e.g., Bamber et al., 1997) 
by including a control for the influence of macroeconomic factors on investor net-buy responses in our 
regression models, the percentage of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms’ outstanding shares traded, 
MKTVOL, on each day in the announcement window.   
 
V.  RESULTS 
Sample Characteristics 
Evolution and Trends in Pro forma Reporting  
Figure 2 illustrates trends in pro forma reporting practice during our sample period. The first chart 
indicates that pro forma reporting, in general, increased over time from 1998 until the middle of 2001 and 
                                                 
17 The Lee-Ready algorithm ignores the current quote if it is less than 5 seconds old and compares the current trade 
price with the bid and ask of the previous quote (which is then assumed to be the current quote) to infer trade 
direction. Studies since then have used a 5-second lag, a 2-second lag, or no lag to define the current quote. Our main 
analyses employ the 5-second lag to define the current quote as in Lee and Ready (1991), but we repeated all our 
analyses using the 2-second lag, or no lag with no qualitative change in the results.     
18 We repeat our analyses using market value of common equity five days prior to the earnings announcement date 
and net sales from the previous quarter as alternative measures of firm size. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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has declined since that time. It is interesting to note that pro forma reporting peaked just prior to the major 
accounting scandals of 2001 and dropped dramatically in the third quarter of 2002—soon after the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which requires explicit reconciliation between pro forma and GAAP 
earnings. The second chart presents trends for adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers for which managers use 
the “pro forma” label, while the third chart shows trends when managers use various other nomenclatures 
described in the Wallace (2002) monograph. For ease of exposition, we group these labels under the “other” 
nomenclature classification. While the use of the “pro forma” nomenclature dropped sharply after the 
passage of SOX, it appears to have recovered somewhat during 2003. Interestingly, the use of other 
nomenclatures dropped as well, but has not recovered to the extent that the pro forma nomenclature has 
recovered by the end of 2003.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
We next investigate the types of firms that report adjusted-GAAP figures more frequently than 
others. Figure 3 illustrates the frequency of adjusted-GAAP reporting by nomenclature across industry 
classifications compared to the frequency distributions of the Compustat and I/B/E/S populations. The 
results suggest that companies that voluntarily disclose pro forma earnings are clustered in a few 
industries (i.e., they are not simply a random draw from the entire population of publicly traded firms). 
Figure 3 indicates that firms issuing alternative profitability measures using the “pro forma” nomenclature 
are heavily concentrated in certain manufacturing (SIC codes 3000-3999) and business service industries 
(SIC codes 7000-7999), while those using other nomenclatures are highly concentrated in financial service 
industries (SIC codes 6000-6999). Figure 3 depicts that these industry concentrations vary significantly 
from both the Compustat and I/B/E/S populations, whose distributions are similar to one another.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
We next examine the frequency with which individual companies report adjusted-GAAP earnings 
figures during our six-year sample period and report the results in Figure 4. The figure reveals that firms 
announce adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers both infrequently and sporadically. Consistent with BBCL 
(2003), Figure 4 indicates that 84% of our sample firms [(1,105 + 479 + 262) ÷ 2,209] report a pro forma 
(adjusted-GAAP) earnings number three times or less during our entire 24-quarter sample period. This 
suggests a second level of self-selection.  Not only is it a small subset of firms concentrated in particular 
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industries that voluntarily reports adjusted-GAAP earnings, but these firms choose when to report these 
alternative profitability figures. Overall, our descriptive evidence suggests that research that employs 
I/B/E/S actual earnings figures (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002), or standard Compustat data items (e.g., 
Brown and Sivakumar, 2003)—based on all or part of the I/B/E/S-Compustat population—as a proxy for 
manager-disclosed pro forma earnings, may not adequately capture the characteristics of the relatively 
small subset of firms whose managers voluntarily elect to report these numbers in select quarterly earnings 
press releases.19,20   
 [Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Specifically, Panel A presents information about various firm 
characteristics, while Panel B provides descriptive statistics regarding the nature of announcement period 
market reactions. The median total assets of our sample firms is $621 million, while the mean is $6.2 
billion—which is higher than the 75th percentile ($2.5 billion). This suggests that while some extremely large 
firms voluntarily disclose adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly press releases, most pro forma 
firms are relatively small. The stock price distribution is also slightly positively skewed with a mean of 
$25.09 and a median of $17.56 per share.  Panel A also presents descriptive statistics for the three earnings 
metrics. As mentioned earlier, our measure of GAAP diluted operating earnings per share, EPSGAAP-OP, 
excludes both below-the-line items and special items. The mean of EPSGAAP-OP is $0.06, suggesting that the 
average operating earnings for our sample firms is positive.21 The mean I/B/E/S actual earnings per share, 
EPSI/B/E/S, is $0.13. The fact that EPSI/B/E/S is higher than EPSGAAP-OP suggests that analysts may exclude some 
recurring expenses, since the vast majority of one-time items (below-the-line and special items) are already 
excluded from our measure of GAAP operating earnings. Finally, the mean EPSPROFORMA is $0.22 suggesting 
                                                 
19  While Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) use essentially the entire I/B/E/S-Compustat population, Brown and Sivakumar 
(2003) screen out observations where the I/B/E/S actual EPS number is equal to a Compustat operating EPS number. 
20 It is likely that our comprehensive search string does not capture all voluntarily disclosed adjusted-GAAP earnings 
figures. However, given Wallace’s (2002) detailed categorization of common adjusted-GAAP nomenclatures, it is 
likely that our expanded search string identifies the majority of these reports. We still find that only 11% of the 
Compustat-I/B/E/S population reports these figures at the peak of adjusted-GAAP reporting. Therefore, we feel that 
the use of commercial database populations to proxy for management-issued adjusted-GAAP figures can largely 
obscure the unique characteristics of this select group of firms that voluntarily discloses pro forma earnings figures. 
21 Our sample firms’ average bottom-line GAAP EPS is $-0.04. Thus, firms that voluntary announce pro forma 
(adjusted-GAAP) earnings are, on average, unprofitable.  
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that managers often exclude more non-recurring expenses than do analysts.22 Panel A also includes 
descriptive statistics for the three forecast error variables used in our analyses.23 The mean FEGAAP-OP, $-0.01, 
suggests that, on average, the GAAP operating income figure (which generally excludes all transitory items) 
falls just short of meeting analysts’ forecasts. Consistent with the notion that analysts sometimes exclude 
recurring expenses (i.e., more than just below-the-line and special items) from their forecasts, the mean 
FEI/B/E/S is positive, $0.03. Finally, the results suggest that managers are more aggressive in excluding 
expenses than analysts since the mean FEPROFORMA, $0.11, is even more positive and significantly greater than 
the mean forecast errors based on both GAAP operating EPS and I/B/E/S actual EPS. Interestingly, the 
Pearson correlations among the three forecast error measures are all significant, although none of the pair-
wise correlations exceeds 30%.24 This suggests that earnings surprise measures based on GAAP operating 
earnings, manager-disclosed pro forma earnings, and I/B/E/S actual EPS capture unique, non-overlapping 
information sets. 
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for our abnormal net-buy measures. These variables 
represent the abnormal net-buy volume (buy volume less sell volume) for different trade-size groups. We 
observe above-normal net-buying activity by small and medium investors, while somewhat below-normal 
net-buying activity by large investors during the announcement period. We also find that small and 
medium abnormal net-buy measures are right-skewed as the means are greater than the medians, while the 
large abnormal net-buy measure is left-skewed.     
 
                                                 
22 We compare all three earnings metrics using both parametric t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests. 
We find that central tendencies (mean and median) of EPSGAAP-OP, EPSI/B/E/S, and EPSPROFORMA are highly statistically 
different from each other. This illustrates that although the three earnings metrics have some commonality in terms 
of exclusions, there are also significant differences among them. This further bolsters our motivation for using all 
three earnings metrics in our examination of sophisticated versus less-sophisticated investor reactions around pro 
forma announcement dates because each earnings metric may have a significant incremental contribution over the 
other two. 
23 In the spirit of conciseness, we only tabulate results based on forecast error variables that use the mean analyst 
forecast as the earnings expectation. Results based on the seasonal random-walk earnings expectation are slightly 
weaker since the seasonal random-walk is a much more noisy expectation than analysts’ consensus forecast. 
However, the results are qualitatively similar and the study’s main inferences remain unchanged. 
24 We obtain the following Pearson correlation coefficients among the three forecast error measures: ρ(FEGAAP-OP, 
FEI/B/E/S) = 0.30, ρ(FEGAAP-OP, FEPROFORMA) = 0.29, ρ(FEPROFORMA, FEI/B/E/S) = 0.26.  
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Who Trades on Pro Forma Information? 
Our first research question investigates who trades on pro forma information—sophisticated 
investors (e.g., institutions), less-sophisticated individual investors, or both. Our second research question 
examines the extent to which the net-buying activities of more-and less-sophisticated investors are 
associated with the pro forma forecast error vis-à-vis forecast errors based on GAAP operating EPS and 
I/B/E/S actual EPS. As previously mentioned, we investigate three trade size categories – small, medium 
and large. We expect that the small trade category will primarily capture the activities of less-sophisticated 
and less-informed individual investors, while the medium and large trade categories will primarily capture 
sophisticated institutional trading. We first examine less-sophisticated investors’ trading activities around 
pro forma earnings announcement dates by estimating the following four regression models:  
   SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α1FEGAAP-OPi + α4SIZEi  + α5MKTVOLt + ε    (1), 
   SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α2FEPROFORMAi + α4SIZEi  + α5MKTVOLt + ε    (2), 
   SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α3FEI/B/E/Si + α4SIZEi  + α5MKTVOLt + ε    (3), 
      SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α1FEGAAP-OPi + α2FEPROFORMAi + α3FEI/B/E/Si + α4SIZEi  + α5MKTVOLt + ε  (4), 
Where:  SML_NETBUYi,t   = small investors’ day t abnormal net-buy volume, 
FEGAAP-OPi   = firm i’s signed GAAP operating earnings forecast error,     
FEPROFORMAi   = firm i’s signed pro forma forecast error,    
FEI/B/E/Si   = firm i’s signed I/B/E/S forecast error,    
SIZEi  = the log of firm i’s total assets at the end of the previous quarter, and 
MKTVOLt  = market-wide trading volume on day t.  
 
The first three models examine the extent to which each of the three earnings surprise metrics 
separately explains less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-buying activities during the three days in 
the announcement period (day -1, day 0 and day +1). A positive (negative) value for SML_NETBUY 
indicates above-normal (below-normal) net-buying activities by less-sophisticated investors during the 
event period. The forecast errors in these analyses are also directional (signed). For example, a positive 
FEPROFORMA indicates good news based on pro forma earnings (i.e., the actual pro forma figure disclosed 
by managers is greater than the earnings expectation). Consequently, a significantly positive coefficient on 
FEPROFORMA in Model 2, α2, would indicate that a higher (lower) pro forma forecast error results in higher 
(lower) abnormal net-buying activities by small investors. In other words, a positive α2 indicates that less-
sophisticated investors are trading (net buying or selling) in the direction of the pro forma earnings 
surprise. Thus, the regression coefficients on the forecast errors in these models are interpreted in the same 
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way one would interpret an earnings response coefficient (ERC) in a return-earnings regression (i.e., a 
positive ERC indicates that price moves in the same direction as the earnings surprise). Finally, Model 4 
regresses SML_NETBUY simultaneously on all three forecast errors. Thus, Model 4 estimates the 
incremental explanatory power of each earnings forecast error, after controlling for the other two forecast 
errors. Since prior research suggests that smaller and larger firms have different investor clienteles (e.g., 
Bhushan, 1989; El-Gazzar, 1998; Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000), we include SIZE to ensure that our results 
are not attributable to differences in firm size. Finally, MKTVOL controls for the influence of market-
wide macroeconomic factors on investor trading responses.25, 26  
 Table 2 reports the results of estimating Models 1 through 4.  Model 1 results indicate that the 
coefficient on the GAAP operating earnings forecast error, FEGAAP-OP (α1), is never significant on any day 
in the event window, suggesting that less-sophisticated investors do not trade on GAAP operating earnings 
information. Model 2 results indicate that the coefficient on, FEPROFORMA (α2), is positive and highly 
significant (two-tailed p-value < 0.001) on day +1 of the announcement window, suggesting that less-
sophisticated investors generally trade in the same direction as the pro forma forecast error (i.e., buy on 
pro forma good news and sell on pro forma bad news) the day after the earnings announcement. The 
coefficient on FEPROFORMA, α2, is not significant on day 0, but it is marginally significant and negative on 
day -1. This result is consistent with the notion that some less-sophisticated investors anticipate the pro 
forma earnings news and trade in the direction opposite the pro forma forecast error the day before the 
announcement. However, since the coefficient is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.09), we are 
reluctant to draw conclusive inferences regarding this result.  The results for Model 3 indicate that the 
coefficient on FEI/B/E/S, α3, is significantly positive on day 0 and day +1, suggesting that less-sophisticated 
investors trade on information in I/B/E/S actual earnings on the day of and the day after the 
announcement. Overall, the results for Models 1 through 3 indicate that less-sophisticated investors trade 
                                                 
25 We winsorize all variables used in the regression analyses at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of 
extreme observations. 
26 To mitigate the effects of skewness in the data, we log-transform small, medium, and large abnormal net-buy 
measures, the forecast error variables, and the firm size measure in the regression models. To avoid taking the 
logarithm of negative or zero numbers, we add a positive constant whenever necessary (e.g., Ajinkya and Jain, 1989; 
Richardson et al., 1986). We also repeat our main analyses using rank-transformed data and obtain qualitatively 
similar results. Finally we find that, despite skewness in the data, our inferences are unchanged when we use 
completely untransformed variables in our analyses. This suggests that our inferences are quite robust and not 
sensitive to any particular transformation.     
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based on (1) information in pro forma earnings on day +1, and (2) information in I/B/E/S actual EPS 
figures on days 0 and +1, but do not trade on the GAAP operating earnings.27,28    
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 Model 4 includes all three forecast errors simultaneously to allow us to examine the incremental 
significance of each in explaining less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-buy volume after controlling 
for the information in the other two earnings surprise variables. The results indicate that on day -1, the 
coefficient on FEPROFORMA (α2) is marginally significantly negative, while the coefficients on FEGAAP-OP (α1) 
and FEI/B/E/S (α3) are insignificant. However, the F-tests indicate that the coefficient on FEPROFORMA is not 
significantly different from the (insignificant) coefficients on the other two forecast errors.  The earnings 
announcement date (day 0) results displayed for Model 4 indicate that the coefficient on FEGAAP-OP (α1) is 
insignificant and the coefficient on FEPROFORMA (α2) is marginally negatively significant. Again, the F-test 
suggests that α1 and α2 are not significantly different from each other. The coefficient on FEI/B/E/S (α3), on the 
other hand, is significantly positive and also significantly greater than the coefficients on FEGAAP-OP and 
FEPROFORMA.  This evidence suggests that the I/B/E/S forecast error has significant incremental explanatory 
power for small-investor abnormal net-buy volume over the other two forecast errors on the day of the 
announcement. On day +1, both the coefficients on FEPROFORMA (α2) and FEI/B/E/S (α3) are significantly 
positive, suggesting that each has significant incremental explanatory power relative to the other on the day 
after the announcement (F-statistics indicate that each coefficient is statistically significantly different from 
                                                 
27 We note that the coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant on day +1 in all four models, suggesting that less-
sophisticated investors are more likely to buy stocks of smaller firms.  The coefficient on MKTVOL is also positive 
and significant on day +1 for models 1 and 3, suggesting that market-wide factors influence less-sophisticated 
investors’ trading. 
28 Additional (untabulated) analyses suggest that the significant association between less-sophisticated investors’ 
abnormal net-buy volume and the pro forma earnings surprise for day +1 relative to the earnings announcement 
holds: (a) for all sub-periods during 1998 to 2003, (b) for all nomenclatures used by managers to describe their pro 
forma earnings figures, and (c) whether or not the pro forma earnings figure or the GAAP number is emphasized 
(placed first) in the press release. Thus, our main inference that less-sophisticated investors rely on information in 
pro forma earnings is quite robust. 
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the other). The coefficient on FEGAAP-OP (α1) is significantly negative and the F-Tests indicate that both α2 
and α3 are significantly greater than α1.29,30, 31  
In summary, the results for Models 1 through 4 paint a consistent picture. We find that GAAP 
operating earnings is not a significant explanator of less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-buying 
activity during the announcement period. On the other hand, not only is the pro forma forecast error a 
significant explanator of less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-buying activities on day +1, but also it 
has significant incremental explanatory power relative to the forecast errors based on I/B/E/S and GAAP 
operating earnings on day +1. Finally, the forecast error based on I/B/E/S actual earnings is significantly 
incrementally associated with less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-buy volume on days 0 and +1.32 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating Models 1 through 4 after replacing SML_NETBUY with 
MED_NETBUY as the dependent variable. MED_NETBUY is designed to capture the abnormal net-
buying activities of sophisticated investors. Investors who submit medium-sized orders may include 
wealthy individuals or institutions intending to disguise their private information by breaking large orders 
into smaller trades (e.g., Cornell and Sirri, 1992; Meulbroek, 1992; Barclay and Warner, 1993).  The 
                                                 
29 One interpretation is that the GAAP operating earnings surprise has no incremental explanatory power after 
controlling for pro forma and I/B/E/S earnings surprises. The fact that the coefficient on the GAAP operating 
earnings forecast error is negative could be a mechanical result. For example, it is possible that additional exclusions 
of non-recurring expenses can convert an operating earnings loss into a pro forma or I/B/E/S profit. Thus, if less-
sophisticated investors generally buy based on good pro forma or I/B/E/S news (i.e. additional exclusions of non-
recurring expenses that convert the GAAP operating loss to a profit), their trades will also appear to be 
systematically opposite in direction from the GAAP operating earnings forecast error.  Therefore, it is conceivable 
that the negative coefficient on FEGAAP-OP is likely a mechanical result driven by the abnormal net-buying activities 
of less-sophisticated investors spurred by good news based on FEPROFORMA and FEI/B/E/S on day +1.  
30 Since prior research finds that trading volume is significantly positively associated with the absolute price change 
(e.g., Karpoff, 1987), we control for firm-specific abnormal returns in regression models 1 through 4 as an additional 
robustness check. This additional control ensures that our results are not attributable to the actions of investors who 
simply trade following large price changes. Consequently, we repeat our Table 2 analyses after including the daily 
size-adjusted abnormal return as an additional control variable.  The abnormal return variable is never significant on 
days -1 and 0 and is always highly significantly positive on day +1, suggesting that less-sophisticated investors do 
react significantly to large price changes.  Nevertheless, our inferences are unchanged even after including this 
additional control, providing evidence that our results are not attributable to less-sophisticated investors’ response to 
large price movements. 
31 Collinearity diagnostics indicate that all condition indices are well within acceptable levels for all regression 
models (Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). 
32 Interestingly, when we estimate Models 1 through 4 using the seasonal random-walk forecast as the earnings 
expectation, we no longer find that the earnings surprise based on I/B/E/S actual EPS is significantly correlated with 
SML_NETBUY separately (Model 3) or together with the other earnings surprise variables (Model 4). In sharp 
contrast, even when we use the random-walk earnings expectation, the pro forma forecast error is still highly 
significantly positively associated with SML_NETBUY separately (Model 2) as well as jointly with the other 
forecast errors (Model 4). Therefore, the result that less-sophisticated investors trade based on information in pro 
forma earnings is likely more robust than the result that these investors trade based on I/B/E/S actual earnings.   
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results from estimating Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 indicate that neither the operating GAAP forecast error 
nor the pro forma forecast error are significantly associated with MED_NETBUY on any day in our 
announcement window. Model 3 indicates that the I/B/E/S forecast error is significantly positively 
associated with MED_NETBUY on day +1. When we include all three forecast errors in Model 4, we find 
similar results. The forecast errors based on GAAP operating income and pro forma earnings are not 
significant on any day in the event window, while the I/B/E/S forecast error is highly significant and 
positive on day +1. The F-tests indicate that the coefficient on the I/B/E/S forecast error is significantly 
greater than the coefficients on the other two forecast errors on day +1. Thus, medium-sized trades that 
likely capture sophisticated investors’ stealth trading activities are associated with the I/B/E/S forecast 
error and not with the pro forma forecast error. This implies that, unlike the case of less-sophisticated 
individual investors, sophisticated institutional investors base their trading decisions on information in 
I/B/E/S street earnings and not on information in managers’ pro forma income figures.     
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Finally, we estimate Models 1 through 4 using LRG_NETBUY as the dependent variable. Table 4 
reports these regression results for large orders. This table shows that none of the coefficients on any of 
the forecast errors is significant on any of the trading days in the announcement window. This suggests 
that sophisticated investors do not submit large orders based on the information in any of the earnings 
surprise variables during the three-day earnings announcement window. Table 1 shows that the 
LRG_NETBUY values are either negative or very close to zero. One of the implications of the combined 
results from Tables 1, 3 and 4 is that sophisticated investors generally avoid information-induced trading 
around pro forma announcement dates (i.e., their abnormal net-buying activities are either negative or 
zero).  However, when they do trade, they likely engage in stealth trading by breaking their large orders 
into medium-sized trades and generally trade on information contained in the I/B/E/S earnings surprise. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Results from Tables 2 through 4 can be summarized as follows. First, less-sophisticated investors 
trade on information in pro forma earnings and on information in I/B/E/S actual earnings. Second, 
earnings surprise variables (forecast errors) based on both pro forma and I/B/E/S street earnings have 
incremental explanatory power relative to the other for explaining less-sophisticated investors’ net-buying 
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activities. Third, less-sophisticated investors in pro forma firms do not trade on information in unexpected 
GAAP operating earnings. Finally, sophisticated investors either avoid trading around pro forma earnings 
announcements, or they trade based on information in I/B/E/S actual earnings using medium-sized trades, 
but do not trade at all based on manager-disclosed pro forma earnings information. Since this body of 
evidence suggests that less-sophisticated investors trade on pro forma earnings information, while 
sophisticated investors do not, if some pro forma disclosures are indeed misleading, less-sophisticated, 
individual investors are most at risk of being misled.33  
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Matched-Sample Tests  
In order to further investigate the seemingly “lukewarm” trading responses of sophisticated 
investors around earnings announcements containing management-issued adjusted-GAAP figures, we 
investigate a matched sample of earnings announcements of firms that do not voluntarily disclose an 
alternative profitability figure in their quarterly earnings press releases. We collect a match for each firm-
quarter observation in our sample by selecting a non-pro-forma “matched” firm for each of our pro forma 
                                                 
33 One might argue that even though less-sophisticated investors trade on pro forma information, while sophisticated 
investors do not, if the sophisticated professional investors almost always set the price, small investors may be “price 
takers” and thus be “price protected.” Therefore, as an aside, we investigate the extent to which small, medium and 
large abnormal net-buying activities are associated with announcement-period price movements. We regress size-
adjusted abnormal returns, cumulated over the three-day announcement period window (CAR), on abnormal small, 
medium, and large net-buy measures (SML_NETBUY, MED_NETBUY, LRG_NETBUY) also cumulated over the 
three-day announcement window. We find that when CAR is regressed separately on each of the abnormal net-buy 
variables, each is significantly positively associated with CAR suggesting that the trading activities of all three 
investor groups are associated with announcement period price movements. However, Vuong’s (1989) likelihood 
ratio tests reveal that the adjusted-R2 for the model where SML_NETBUY is the dependent variable is significantly 
higher than the adjusted-R2 values for the models where MED_NETBUY or LRG_NETBUY are the dependent 
variable. Moreover, when we regress CAR simultaneously on all three aggregated abnormal net-buy measures, the 
coefficient on SML_NETBUY is significantly higher (based on F-tests) than the coefficients on the other two 
abnormal net-buy measures, although all three coefficients are statistically significant. These results suggest that 
small investors may have a role in setting prices (which is not surprising given our evidence that sophisticated 
investors do not engage in particularly heavy trading around pro forma announcements), and as a result may not 
always be “price protected.”  
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firms based on firm size and industry.34  We investigate small-, medium-, and large-investor abnormal net-
buying activities around these (non-pro-forma) matched-sample earnings announcements.  
The untabulated results indicate that the forecast error based on GAAP operating earnings is 
significantly positively associated with MED_NETBUY, but only on the day of the earnings 
announcement. More importantly, the results also reveal that the I/B/E/S forecast error is significantly 
positively associated with both MED_NETBUY as well as LRG_NETBUY on all three days in the 
announcement window. These results suggest that sophisticated investors generally trade significantly 
around earnings announcements. Recall that MED_NETBUY is never associated with GAAP operating 
earnings surprise in our sample of adjusted-GAAP earnings announcements, and it is only associated with 
the I/B/E/S earnings surprise on day +1 relative to the announcement, while LRG_NETBUY is never 
associated with GAAP operating earnings or I/B/E/S actual earnings surprise. Thus, the lukewarm trading 
reaction of sophisticated investors we observe around pro forma earnings announcements is not attributable 
to the lack of power in our sophisticated investor proxies. Rather it appears that when firms announce 
adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers, sophisticated investors either refrain from actively trading during the 
announcement period, or trade cautiously later in the announcement window primarily using medium-sized 
trades. 
Finally, the matched-sample results indicate that SML_NETBUY is significantly associated with 
forecast errors based on both GAAP operating income and I/B/E/S street earnings on the day of the earnings 
announcement. However, neither earnings surprise variable is incrementally informative relative to the 
other in explaining less-sophisticated investors’ net-buying activities.  Interestingly, we never find any 
evidence in our pro forma sample that less-sophisticated investors trade on information in GAAP operating 
                                                 
34 For each of our pro forma firms, we first select all firms in the same Compustat size-decile (based on both market 
value of common equity and total assets) that are not part of our sample of pro forma announcers. From this pool, we 
then sequentially match on 4-digit, 3-digit and 2-digit SIC codes. If we obtain multiple matches based on this process 
within 4-, 3-, or 2-digit SIC codes for a given pro forma firm, we randomly select one of the available matches.  In 
all instances, we use the match from the most specific industry code with available data for our regression analyses. 
Given that our comprehensive search string likely picks up the majority of adjusted-GAAP announcements during 
our sample period, our matched-firms, by and large, did not announce adjusted-GAAP earnings figures along with 
their audited GAAP earnings numbers in their earnings press releases.  However, to the extent that our search string 
could miss actual adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in matched-sample press releases, it would work against our 
finding differences in market reactions between our pro forma sample and matched-sample firms. 
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earnings, implying that when presented with both pro forma and GAAP operating figures, less-sophisticated 
investors focus on manager-adjusted pro forma information.35         
An Alternative Specification to Assess the Sensitivity of the Results to the Errors-in-Variables Problem  
Prior research discusses the potential ramifications of the classic errors-in-variables problem 
associated with using the mean analyst forecast as the expectation in calculating forecast errors for different 
earnings metrics (e.g., Bradshaw, 2003; BBCL, 2003; Berger, 2005). Since forecast tracking services, such 
as I/B/E/S, attempt to exclude the same items from the reported “street” earnings number that analysts 
exclude from their forecasts, the “street” forecast error will generally have less measurement error than 
forecast errors that match GAAP operating earnings or manager-adjusted pro forma earnings with analysts’ 
expectation. In order to ensure that our results are not attributable to measurement error, we first use a 
random-walk earnings expectation based on GAAP operating earnings (as previously explained), and find 
qualitatively similar, though weaker results. Since the random-walk earnings expectation is a relatively 
outdated and inaccurate proxy for the market’s expectation, the resulting earnings surprise measures are 
likely quite noisy (although the GAAP operating earnings forecast error based on this expectation is 
unbiased) and may reduce the power of the statistical tests. Therefore, we revisit the measurement error 
issue using a different approach. Gu and Chen’s (2004) Figure 1 provides a useful framework for 
understanding how standard GAAP earnings measures differ from the street earnings numbers published by 
forecast tracking services (such as I/B/E/S). We extend this framework to illustrate how our three earnings 
                                                 
35 We also perform alternative matched-sample analyses using a “within-sample” design in which we examine 
earnings announcements of our pro forma sample firms for quarters in which they do not disclose an adjusted-GAAP 
number (as defined by our comprehensive search string). We identify a “non-pro-forma” quarter for each of our 
sample observations by systematically going back four quarters and then forward four quarters from the pro forma 
announcement date until we find a quarter where managers do not disclose an adjusted-GAAP number (i.e., the 
earnings announcement is not captured by our search strings). We then repeat our main analyses on this set of “non-
pro-forma” earnings announcements. We find that small investors trade on FEGAAP-OP on days 0 and +1 and on 
FEI/B/E/S on all three days during the announcement period. Medium investors also trade on FEGAAP-OP on day 0 and 
on FEI/B/E/S on all three days in the announcement window. However, we find no evidence that large investors trade 
on any of the forecast errors. Thus, sophisticated investors appear to use medium-sized trades in response to the 
GAAP operating earnings surprise on the day of the announcement and in response to the I/B/E/S actual earnings 
surprise throughout the announcement window. We note that when the same set of firms announce adjusted-GAAP 
earnings figures along with their standard GAAP earnings number, we find no evidence that either small or medium 
investors ever trade on GAAP operating earnings and medium investors only trade on I/B/E/S information on day 
+1. These analyses provide further support to the notion that sophisticated investors are skeptical about management-
issued adjusted-GAAP profitability figures and trade more hesitantly when earnings announcements contain these 
disclosures.  
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metrics differ from one another and to motivate alternative specifications of our regression models that are 
not sensitive to the errors-in-variables problem.   
We first briefly discuss the Gu and Chen (2004), hereafter GC, framework and then introduce our 
alternative model specifications. Figure 5 illustrates the main elements of the GC framework.36 GC 
separate what they call “Core EPS” (which is essentially recurring income), from the transitory 
components of earnings (special items and below-the-line items). CORE_COMMON in the first chart of 
Figure 5 represents recurring items that are included in both GAAP operating earnings as well as analysts’ 
definition of street earnings. Analysts generally exclude non-recurring special items from their street 
earnings number.  We label special items excluded by analysts as SPEC_ANALEXC. GC also entertain 
the possibility that analysts choose to include some one-time special items in their definition of street 
earnings (SPEC_ANALINC). However, it is plausible that analysts choose to exclude some recurring 
items from street earnings that are part of core EPS (CORE_ANALEXC).37 The brackets on the right side 
of the first chart of Figure 5 illustrate how different EPS measures are defined in the context of GC’s 
framework: (1) GC’s characterization of street earnings, (2) GAAP EPS before extraordinary items, (3) 
GAAP EPS after extraordinary items, and (4) comprehensive income.  
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
Managers’ definition of adjusted-GAAP earnings is usually similar to analysts’ definition of street 
earnings except that managers frequently exclude additional core or recurring items that analysts do not 
exclude. In fact, Table 1 shows that EPSPROFORMA is significantly greater than EPSI/B/E/S implying that 
managers exclude expenses more aggressively than analysts. Thus, the second chart of Figure 5 includes a 
separate adjustment category for additional manager exclusions of recurring items (CORE_MGREXC) 
                                                 
36 We use slightly different labels that we feel are more descriptive of the various earnings components mentioned in 
the GC framework. 
37 One noticeable difference between our characterization of the GC framework in Figure 5 and the original Gu and 
Chen (2004) Figure 1 is the placement of analysts’ “other exclusions” (which we call CORE_ANALEXC). GC place 
analysts’ additional exclusions between excluded one-time special items (which we call SPEC_ANALEXC) and 
extraordinary items in their Figure 1. However, we emphasize that one-time items are classified as “special items” or 
“below-the-line” extraordinary items for the vast majority of our observations.  Thus, when analysts have “other 
exclusions,” these exclusions are generally components of recurring income. Thus, we position other analyst 
exclusions (CORE_ANALEXC) in the core EPS section of the income statement and  place this variable at the top of 
the “bar” in order to more easily isolate the components of different EPS measures.  
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beyond those made by analysts (CORE_ANALEXC).38 The left side of the second chart illustrates the fact 
that analysts’ street earnings can have several alternative definitions. Street EPS1 illustrates a situation 
where analysts exclude all one-time items as well as at least one recurring item.  Street EPS2 represents a 
situation where analysts choose to include one or more special items (SPEC_ANALINC) and they exclude 
at least one recurring item (CORE_ANALEXC). Street EPS3 includes one or more one-time items 
(SPEC_ANALINC), but does not exclude any recurring items. Finally, Street EPS4 represents a situation 
where analysts exclude all one-time items and do not exclude any recurring items. 
The brackets on the right side of the second chart depict our three EPS metrics. Note that our 
definition of GAAP operating EPS, EPSGAAP-OP, always excludes special items and “below-the-line” items. 
Thus, EPSGAAP-OP equals recurring EPS or GC’s “Core EPS” in this framework. GC focus on how analysts’ 
treatment of special items affects investors’ perceptions of these items. They find that special items that 
analysts choose to include in their street earnings number (SPEC_ANALINC) are perceived by investors to 
be more persistent than special items that analysts choose to exclude from street earnings 
(SPEC_ANALEXC). While this result is interesting, both analysts and managers exclude one-time items 
the vast majority of the time. Thus, the applicability of GC’s results is limited to somewhat rare situations 
where analysts choose to include a one-time item. Consequently, we focus on the more general scenario 
where analysts (and managers) choose to exclude all one-time items. Therefore, although we acknowledge 
that some of our EPSI/B/E/S observations correspond to the Street EPS2, Street EPS3, or Street EPS4 
definitions, the vast majority of our EPSI/B/E/S observations map into Street EPS1. Finally, as mentioned 
earlier, managers generally exclude all one-time items (Extraordinary Items, SPEC_ANALEXC, and 
SPEC_ANALINC) as well as additional recurring items beyond analysts’ recurring exclusions. Thus, 
EPSPROFORMA simply represents CORE_COMMON in the second chart of Figure 5.  
The advantage of the GC framework is that it allows us to investigate the extent to which investors 
focus on managers’ incremental exclusions of recurring items (CORE_MGREXC) beyond those excluded by 
analysts.  Recall that in this framework, CORE_MGREXC is simply the difference between EPSPROFORMA and 
EPSI/B/E/S. Specifically, if a particular investor group trades on managers’ incremental adjustments, we would 
                                                 
38 We find that analysts’ mean (median) exclusion of recurring items (CORE_ANALEXC), calculated as   
EPSI/B/E/S – EPSGAAP-OP, is $0.07 ($0.01) and that managers’ mean (median) incremental exclusion of recurring items 
(CORE_MGREXC), calculated as EPSPROFORMA - EPSI/B/E/S, is $0.10 ($0.00). 
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expect CORE_MGREXC to be significantly positively associated with that group’s abnormal trading 
response. Hence, we use an alternative specification of Model 3 that allows us to investigate the extent to 
which sophisticated vis-à-vis less-sophisticated investors react to managers’ incremental adjustments:  
   SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α3FEI/B/E/Si + α4CORE_MGREXC  +  α5SIZEi  + α6MKTVOLt + ε    (5a), 
   MED_NETBUYi,t = β0 + β 3FEI/B/E/Si + β 4CORE_MGREXC  +  β 5SIZEi  + β 6MKTVOLt + ε    (5b), 
   LRG_NETBUYi,t = γ0 + γ 3FEI/B/E/Si + γ 4CORE_MGREXC  +  γ 5SIZEi  + γ 6MKTVOLt + ε    (5c), 
Where:  CORE_MGREXC = EPSPROFORMA - EPSI/B/E/S.  
 
We employ FEI/B/E/S in these regressions to control for the earnings surprise since the (unbiased) I/B/E/S 
forecast error is the most accurate measure of surprise or “new information” in earnings. Specifically, this 
specification avoids the errors-in-variables problem because it does not match GAAP operating earnings or 
managers’ pro forma earnings with analysts’ consensus expectation to calculate the forecast error. 
Thus, α4, β4, and γ4 capture the incremental contribution of managers’ additional exclusions of 
recurring items (beyond analysts’ core exclusions) in explaining small, medium and large investors’ abnormal 
net-buying activities, respectively. Since CORE_MGREXC equals EPSPROFORMA minus EPSI/B/E/S, it is positive 
when EPSPROFORMA is greater than EPSI/B/E/S.   Consequently, a positive and significant α4 would indicate that 
managers’ incremental income increasing exclusions of recurring items prompt small investors to intensify 
their abnormal net-buying activities, an indication that small investors trade based on managers’ pro forma 
adjustments. Likewise, medium (large) investors’ increased abnormal net-buying activities in response to 
managers’ incremental income increasing exclusions would result in a significantly positive β4 (γ4) 
coefficient.  
Table 5 reports the results of estimating these regressions. The first panel reports Model 5a results and 
indicates that the coefficient on FEI/B/E/S, α3, is significantly positive on day 0 while the coefficient on 
CORE_MGREXC, α4, is significantly negative. Thus, it appears that a subset of small investors decreases 
their abnormal net-buying activities on the day of the announcement when managers voluntarily disclose 
income increasing adjusted-GAAP earnings figures. In contrast, α4 is highly significantly positive on day +1 
(as is α3). Thus, small investors appear to intensify their abnormal net-buying activities the day after the 
earnings announcement in response to managers’ income increasing exclusions of recurring items, suggesting 
that managers’ adjusted-GAAP disclosures influence small investors’ trading decisions. The second panel 
 29
reports results for Model 5b (medium orders) and reveals that while the coefficient on FEI/B/E/S, β3, is 
significant on day +1, the coefficient on CORE_MGREXC, β4, is never statistically significant, suggesting 
that medium-sized investors do not buy incrementally more based on managers’ incremental exclusions. 
Finally, the third panel repeats the same regressions for large orders (Model 5c) and shows that neither γ3 nor 
γ4 is ever significant, suggesting that large investors’ trading activities are not associated with the forecast 
error or manager’s exclusions during the announcement period.     
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Taken together, these analyses are highly consistent with our main results. We find that managers’ 
income increasing exclusions of recurring items beyond analysts’ exclusions significantly increase abnormal 
net-buying activities of less-sophisticated investors (i.e., the small trade-size group), but have no impact on 
the abnormal net-buying activities of sophisticated investors (i.e., the medium and large trade-size groups). 
Since this specification circumvents the errors-in-variables problem, our main inference–that primarily less-
sophisticated investors trade on information in pro forma earnings, while more-sophisticated investors do not 
trade on pro forma earnings information—is robust to concerns about measurement error. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Regulators and standard setters have expressed concern that managers’ pro forma disclosures are 
incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading to investors. Recent experimental research suggests that more-
versus less-sophisticated investors may respond differently to these non-standard, adjusted-GAAP 
earnings measures disclosed by managers. Since less-wealthy, individual investors lack the necessary 
sophistication to understand the accuracy and reliability of these disclosures, they are most at risk of being 
misled. Consequently, this study examines intraday transactions around 5,736 earnings announcements 
that accompany pro forma disclosures between January 1998 and December 2003 to investigate which 
class of investors primarily trades on pro forma earnings information: sophisticated institutional investors, 
less-wealthy and less-sophisticated individual investors, or both.  
Our results suggest that the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings is significantly positively 
associated with the abnormal net-buying activities of the less-sophisticated, primarily individual class of 
investors on the day after the announcement. The results also indicate that the pro forma earnings surprise is 
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significantly incrementally informative relative to the earnings surprise measures based on GAAP operating 
earnings and I/B/E/S actual earnings in explaining less-sophisticated investors’ announcement-period 
abnormal net-buying activities. We find that less-sophisticated investors also trade based on the I/B/E/S 
earnings surprise, which is incrementally informative relative to the pro forma and GAAP earnings 
surprises. In sharp contrast, we find that sophisticated investors either avoid trading around pro forma 
earnings announcements, or they trade later in the announcement period (only on day +1) based on 
information in I/B/E/S actual earnings, but they never trade based on manager-disclosed pro forma earnings 
information. In order to further investigate the seemingly “lukewarm” trading responses of sophisticated 
investors around earnings announcements containing management-issued pro forma figures, we investigate 
a matched sample of earnings announcements of firms that do not voluntarily disclose pro forma numbers. 
This additional analysis suggests that the lukewarm trading reaction of sophisticated investors is not 
attributable to the lack of power in our sophisticated investor proxies because these investors appear to trade 
significantly around the earnings announcements of the matched sample. Thus, it appears that when firms 
announce adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers, sophisticated investors either refrain from actively trading 
during the announcement period, or trade cautiously later in the announcement window. Overall, our results 
suggest that the market reaction to pro forma earnings information is almost exclusively attributable to the 
less-sophisticated investors.  
A caveat in our research design is that it is susceptible to measurement errors introduced by the 
errors-in-variables problem. This problem arises because forecast tracking services, such as I/B/E/S, attempt 
to exclude the same items from their “street” earnings number that analysts exclude from their forecasts.  
Thus, the I/B/E/S forecast error generally has less measurement error than forecast errors computed by 
subtracting the mean analysts’ forecast from GAAP operating earnings or manager-adjusted pro forma 
earnings. In order to ensure that our results are not attributable to measurement error, we extend the Gu and 
Chen (2004) framework to motivate an alternative specification that allows us to examine investors’ reactions 
to managers’ incremental earnings adjustments beyond those made by analysts after controlling for earnings 
surprise. We subtract analysts’ mean forecast from I/B/E/S actual EPS figure to measure earnings surprise. 
Since this earnings surprise measure does not suffer from the measurement error introduced by mismatching 
different definitions of earnings, this specification likely circumvents the errors-in-variables problem. Results 
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of estimating this alternative specification indicate that less-sophisticated investors’ abnormal net-buying 
activities are significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of managers’ incremental 
adjustments beyond analysts’ adjustments even after appropriately controlling for earnings surprise. However, 
managers’ incremental adjustments have no impact on the abnormal net-buying activities of sophisticated 
investors. These results show that the study’s main inference that primarily less-sophisticated investors trade 
on information in pro forma earnings, while more-sophisticated investors do not, is robust to concerns about 
measurement error. 
These results have relevance in the post-Enron and post-SOX regulatory and disclosure 
environment. Legislators and regulators are increasingly concerned regarding the proliferation of pro 
forma earnings figures published by managers, and early evidence suggests that these disclosures may be 
misleading and strategically motivated. Thus, our evidence that less-sophisticated, primarily individual 
investors trade on pro forma earnings information, while sophisticated institutional investors do not, is 
relevant to standard setters and regulators mandating and monitoring corporate disclosures to protect the 
interests of potentially less-informed investors.      
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FIGURE 1 
Distribution of Average Dollar Value of Shares Traded During the Announcement Period 
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FIGURE 2 
The Percentage of Firms on both Compustat and I/B/E/S Reporting Adjusted-GAAP Earnings 
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FIGURE 3 
Industry Classification of Adjusted-GAAP Firms Relative to the Compustat and I/B/E/S Populations 
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FIGURE 4 
Frequency of Adjusted-GAAP Reporting During the Sample Period 
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FIGURE 5 
Comparison of Our Earnings Metrics to the Gu and Chen (2004) Framework 
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of Our Earnings Metrics to the Gu and Chen (2004) Framework 
 
Panel A:  Firm Characteristics, Earnings Metrics, and Forecast Errors  
Variable1   
25th    
Percentile Mean   Median  
75th     
Percentile 
SIZE  185.034 6,172.211 620.780 2,458.769 
PRICE  8.680 25.088 17.562 31.500 
EPSGAAP-OP  -0.121 0.059 0.090 0.330 
EPSI/B/E/S  -0.030 0.128 0.130 0.310 
EPSPROFORMA  -0.010 0.223 0.150 0.390 
FEGAAP-OP  0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.000 
FEI/B/E/S  0.000 0.025 0.000 0.001 
FEPROFORMA  0.000 0.114 0.001 0.003 
Panel B:  Order Imbalance Variables  
Variable1   
25th    
Percentile Mean   Median  
75th     
Percentile 
SML_NETBUY-1  -0.017 0.010 0.000 0.024 
SML_NETBUY0  -0.016 0.010 0.001 0.028 
SML_NETBUY+1  -0.013 0.019 0.003 0.025 
MED_NETBUY-1  -0.045 0.011 0.003 0.057 
MED_NETBUY0  -0.048 0.019 0.009 0.074 
MED_NETBUY+1 -0.037 0.013 0.006 0.054 
LRG_NETBUY-1  -0.111 -0.011 0.005 0.140 
LRG_NETBUY0  -0.130 -0.024 0.006 0.183 
LRG_NETBUY+1  -0.097 -0.021 0.005 0.123 
1Statistics for all variables are based on 5,736 observations. 
SIZE = Total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter 
PRICE = Stock price five days before the pro forma earnings announcement date 
EPSGAAP-OP = Compustat diluted operating earnings per share 
EPSPROFORMA = Managers' Adjusted-GAAP earnings per share from the press release 
EPSI/B/E/S = I/B/E/S actual earnings per share 
FEGAAP-OP = Forecast error calculated as Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, 
scaled by price on day t-5 
FEPROFORMA = Forecast error calculated as managers' Adjusted-GAAP EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, 
scaled by price on day t-5 
FEI/B/E/S = Forecast error calculated as I/B/E/S actual EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by 
price on day t-5 
SML_NETBUY = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of small investors (all trades less 
than or equal to $7,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date scaled by non-
announcement period total volume.   
MED_NETBUY = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of medium-sized investors (all trades 
greater than $7,000 and less than or equal to $50,000) on day t relative to earnings announcement 
date scaled by non-announcement period total volume. 
LRG_NETBUY = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of large investors (all trades greater 
$50,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date scaled by non-announcement 
period total volume.   
 42
TABLE 2 
Small Investors’ Abnormal Net-Buy Volume Regressed on the GAAP Operating Earnings Forecast Error, Pro Forma Forecast Error, 
I/B/E/S Forecast Error, and Control Variables (Based on 5,736 Pro Forma Press Releases Issued between 1998 and 2003) 
 
Model 1:  SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α1FEGAAP-OPi +  α4SIZEi  + α5MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(α0) 
Coefficient on 
FEGAAP-OPi (α1)   
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (α4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (α5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 0.006 
(0.65) 
-0.021 
(-0.73) 
  -0.001 
(-1.00) 
0.001 
(0.49) 
-0.02% 
   
      Day 0 -0.002 
(-0.19) 
0.028 
(0.77) 
  0.000 
(-0.00) 
0.002 
(1.06 ) 
-0.02% 
   
      Day +1 0.054 
(6.14)*** 
0.027 
( 0.99 ) 
  -0.008 
(-10.60)*** 
0.002 
(2.09)** 
1.94% 
   
Model 2:  SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α2FEPROFORMAi +  α4SIZEi  + α5MKTVOLt + ε          
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(α0)  
Coefficient on 
FEPROFORMAi (α2)  
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (α4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (α5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 0.008 
(0.81) 
 -0.045 
(-1.70)* 
 -0.001 
(-1.28) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.02% 
   
      Day 0 -0.002 
(-0.13) 
 -0.028 
(-0.83) 
 0.000 
( -0.09) 
0.002 
(1.05) 
-0.02% 
   
      Day +1 0.048 
(5.46)*** 
 0.224 
(9.27)*** 
 -0.007 
(-9.14)*** 
0.002 
(1.59  ) 
3.37% 
   
Model 3:  SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α3FEI/B/E/Si +  α4SIZEi  + α5MKTVOLt + ε            
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(α0)   
Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (α3) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (α4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (α5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 0.006 
(0.64) 
  0.069 
(0.62) 
-0.001 
(-1.01) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
-0.02% 
   
      Day 0 -0.004 
(-0.31) 
  0.539 
(3.74)*** 
0.000 
(0.18 ) 
0.002 
(1.05 ) 
0.21% 
   
      Day +1 0.052 
(5.98)*** 
  0.600 
(5.73)*** 
-0.008 
(-10.34)*** 
0.002 
( 2.04)** 
2.48% 
   
 43
TABLE 2 Continued 
 
Model 4:  SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α1FEGAAP-OPi + α2FEPROFORMAi + α3FEI/B/E/Si + α4SIZEi  + α5MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(α0) 
Coefficient on 
FEGAAP-OPi (α1) 
Coefficient on 
FEPROFORMAi (α2) 
Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (α3) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (α4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (α5) Adjusted-R2 
F-Test 
Ho: α1 = α2  
F-Test 
Ho: α1 = α3  
F-Test 
Ho: α2 = α3   
      Day -1 0.007 
(0.79) 
-0.016 
(-0.51) 
-0.049 
(-1.75)* 
0.143 
(1.19) 
-0.001 
(-1.22) 
0.001 
(0.55) 
0.01% 0.50 1.46     2.24 
      Day 0 -0.002 
(-0.19) 
0.004 
(0.09) 
-0.067 
( -1.85)* 
0.610 
(3.96)*** 
0.000 
(-0.10) 
0.002 
(1.15) 
0.24% 1.36 13.02*** 16.93*** 
      Day +1 0.046 
(5.30)*** 
-0.077 
(-2.66)*** 
0.217 
(8.41)*** 
0.433 
(3.89)*** 
-0.007 
(-8.82)*** 
0.002 
(1.50) 
3.65% 46.75*** 17.60*** 3.28* 
1Parameter estimates reported first followed by t-statistics in parentheses 
*   significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
**  significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
SML_NETBUYi,t = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of small investors (all trades less than or equal to $7,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date.   
FEGAAP-OPi = Signed forecast error calculated as Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
FEPROFORMAi = Signed forecast error calculated as managers' Adjusted-GAAP EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
FEI/B/E/Si = Signed forecast error calculated as I/B/E/S actual EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
SIZEi = The log of total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter 
MKTVOLt = Total market volume of all firms on CRSP on  day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding on day t  
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TABLE 3 
Medium-Sized Investors’ Abnormal Net-Buy Volume Regressed on the GAAP Operating Earnings Forecast Error, Pro Forma Forecast 
Error, I/B/E/S Forecast Error, and Control Variables (Based on 5,736 Pro Forma Press Releases Issued between 1998 and 2003) 
 
Model 1:  MED_NETBUYi,t = β0 + β1FEGAAP-OPi +  β4SIZEi  + β5MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(β0) 
Coefficient on 
FEGAAP-OPi (β1)   
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (β 4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (β5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 0.006 
(0.43) 
-0.071 
(-1.57) 
  0.000 
(0.20) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
-0.01% 
   
      Day 0 0.024 
(1.39) 
0.053 
(1.02) 
  0.000 
(0.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.51 ) 
-0.03% 
   
      Day +1 0.023 
(1.90)* 
0.022 
( 0.61) 
  0.000 
(-0.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.89) 
-0.03% 
   
Model 2:  MED_NETBUYi,t = β0 + β2FEPROFORMAi +  β4SIZEi  + β5MKTVOLt + ε          
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(β0)  
Coefficient on 
FEPROFORMAi (β2)  
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (β4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (β5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 0.009 
(0.58) 
 -0.057 
(-1.41) 
 0.000 
(-0.09) 
0.001 
(0.30) 
-0.02% 
   
      Day 0 0.025 
(1.41) 
 -0.019 
(-0.40) 
 0.000 
( 0.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
-0.04% 
   
      Day +1 0.023 
(1.92)* 
 -0.021 
 (-0.65) 
 0.000 
(-0.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.88) 
-0.03% 
   
Model 3:  MED_NETBUYi,t = β0 + β3FEI/B/E/Si +  β4SIZEi  + β5MKTVOLt + ε            
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(β0)   
Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (β3) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (β4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (β5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 0.007 
(0.46) 
  -0.090 
(-0.51) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
0.000 
(0.27) 
-0.05% 
   
      Day 0 0.023 
(1.34) 
  0.235 
(1.17) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.02% 
   
      Day +1 0.022 
(1.81)* 
  0.354 
    (2.49)** 
0.000 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
( -0.93) 
0.07% 
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TABLE 3 Continued 
 
Model 4:  MED_NETBUYi,t = β0 + β1FEGAAP-OPi + β2FEPROFORMAi + β3FEI/B/E/Si + β4SIZEi  + β5MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(β0) 
Coefficient on 
FEGAAP-OPi (β1) 
Coefficient on 
FEPROFORMAi (β2) 
Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (β3) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (β4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (β5) Adjusted-R2 
F-Test 
Ho: β1 = β2  
F-Test 
Ho: β1 = β3  
F-Test 
Ho: β2 = β3   
      Day -1 0.008 
(0.52) 
-0.058 
(-1.20) 
-0.043 
(-0.98) 
0.027 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
-0.03% 0.04 0.17          0.12 
      Day 0 0.025 
(1.41) 
0.051 
(0.90) 
-0.047 
( -0.93) 
0.228 
(1.06) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
-0.03% 1.35 0.57      1.43 
      Day +1 0.023 
 (1.91)* 
0.007 
(0.19) 
-0.049 
(-1.39) 
0.403 
        (2.65)*** 
0.000 
(-0.47) 
-0.001 
(-0.84) 
0.07% 0.92      5.68**      7.69*** 
1Parameter estimates reported first followed by t-statistics in parentheses 
*   significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
**  significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
MED_NETBUYi,t = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of medium-sized investors (all trades greater than $7,000 and less than or equal to $50,000) on day t relative 
to the earnings announcement date.   
FEGAAP-OPi = Signed forecast error calculated as Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
FEPROFORMAi = Signed forecast error calculated as managers' Adjusted-GAAP EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
FEI/B/E/Si = Signed forecast error calculated as I/B/E/S actual EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
SIZEi = The log of total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter 
MKTVOLt = Total market volume of all firms on CRSP on  day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding on day t  
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TABLE 4 
Large Investors’ Abnormal Net-Buy Volume Regressed on the GAAP Operating Earnings Forecast Error, Pro Forma Forecast Error, 
I/B/E/S Forecast Error, and Control Variables (Based on 5,736 Pro Forma Press Releases Issued between 1998 and 2003) 
 
Model 1:  LRG_NETBUYi,t = γ0 + γ1FEGAAP-OPi +  γ4SIZEi  + γ5MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(γ0) 
Coefficient on 
FEGAAP-OPi (γ1)   
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (γ4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (γ5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 -0.027 
(-0.71) 
0.070 
(0.62) 
  0.007 
   (2.09)** 
-0.002 
(-0.41) 
0.04% 
   
      Day 0 -0.147 
(-3.13)*** 
0.199 
(1.42) 
  0.015 
      (3.97)*** 
0.006 
(1.11) 
0.29% 
   
      Day +1 0.029 
(1.18) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
  0.001 
(0.39) 
-0.002 
(-0.77) 
     -0.04% 
   
Model 2:  LRG_NETBUYi,t = γ0 + γ2FEPROFORMAi +  γ4SIZEi  + γ5MKTVOLt + ε          
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(γ0)  
Coefficient on 
FEPROFORMAi (γ2)  
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (γ4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (γ5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 -0.031 
(-0.83) 
 0.124 
(1.19) 
 0.007 
    (2.27)** 
-0.002 
(-0.47) 
0.05% 
   
      Day 0 -0.149 
(-3.15)*** 
 0.044 
(0.35) 
 0.016 
       (4.06)*** 
0.006 
(1.01) 
0.25% 
   
      Day +1 0.030 
(1.22) 
 -0.043 
        (-0.63) 
 0.001 
(0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
-0.03% 
   
Model 3:  LRG_NETBUYi,t = γ0 + γ3FEI/B/E/Si +  γ4SIZEi  + γ5MKTVOLt + ε            
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(γ0)   
Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (γ3) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (γ4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (γ5) Adjusted-R2    
      Day -1 -0.027 
(-0.73) 
  0.084 
(0.19) 
0.007 
  (2.13)** 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
0.03% 
   
      Day 0 -0.148 
(-3.14)*** 
  0.095 
(0.17) 
0.016 
    (4.06)*** 
0.006 
(1.03) 
0.25% 
   
      Day +1 0.029 
(1.16) 
  0.174 
(0.59) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
-0.002 
( -0.78) 
-0.03% 
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Model 4:  LRG_NETBUYi,t = γ0 + γ1FEGAAP-OPi + γ2FEPROFORMAi + γ3FEI/B/E/Si + γ4SIZEi  + γ5MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept 
(γ0) 
Coefficient on 
FEGAAP-OPi (γ1) 
Coefficient on 
FEPROFORMAi (γ2) 
Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (γ3) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (γ4) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (γ5) Adjusted-R2 
F-Test 
Ho: γ1 = γ2  
F-Test 
Ho: γ1 = γ3  
F-Test 
Ho: γ2 = γ3   
      Day -1 -0.031 
(-0.81) 
0.038 
(0.30) 
0.119 
(1.07) 
-0.094 
(-0.20) 
0.007 
    (2.23)** 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
0.02% 0.19 0.06     0.18 
      Day 0 -0.147 
(-3.11)*** 
0.213 
(1.40) 
-0.006 
(-0.05) 
-0.149 
(-0.26) 
0.015 
     (3.89)*** 
0.006 
(1.11) 
0.25% 0.93 0.32 0.05 
      Day +1 0.030 
(1.21) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
-0.058 
(-0.79) 
0.245 
(0.77) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.73) 
-0.06% 0.21 0.51 0.79 
1Parameter estimates reported first followed by t-statistics in parentheses 
*   significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
**  significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
LRG_NETBUYi,t = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of large investors (all trades greater $50,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date.   
FEGAAP-OPi = Signed forecast error calculated as Compustat diluted operating EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
FEPROFORMAi = Signed forecast error calculated as managers' Adjusted-GAAP EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
FEI/B/E/Si = Signed forecast error calculated as I/B/E/S actual EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
SIZEi = The log of total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter 
MKTVOLt = Total market volume of all firms on CRSP on  day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding on day t  
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TABLE 5 
The Impact of Managers’ Incremental Adjustments beyond Analysts’ Exclusions on Small, Medium, and Large Investor Abnormal Net-
Buy Volume after Controlling for the I/B/E/S Forecast Error (Based on 5,736 Pro Forma Press Releases Issued between 1998 and 2003)1 
 
Model 5a:  SML_NETBUYi,t = α0 + α3FEI/B/E/Si +  α4CORE_MGREXC    +  α5SIZEi  + α6MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept (α0) Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (α3) 
Coefficient on 
CORE_MGREXCi (α4) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (α5) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (α6) 
Adjusted-R2 
      Day -1 0.007 
(0 77)
0.068 
(0 61)
-0.041 
(-1 48)
-0.001 
(-1 21)
0.001 
(0 57)
-0.00% 
      Day 0 -0.002 
(-0 19)
0.538 
(3 74)***
-0.074 
(-2 07)**
-0.000 
(-0 11 )
0.002 
(1 16 )
0.27% 
      Day +1 0.048 
(5.45)*** 
0.591 
(5.67)*** 
0.194 
(7.55)*** 
-0.007 
(-9.23)*** 
0.002 
( 1.68)* 
3.43% 
Model 5b:  MED_NETBUYi,t = β0 + β3FEI/B/E/Si +  β4CORE_MGREXC    +  β5SIZEi  + β6MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept (β0) Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (β3) 
Coefficient on 
CORE_MGREXCi (β4) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (β5) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (β6) 
Adjusted-R2 
      Day -1 0.008 
(0 56)
-0.091 
(-0 52)
-0.053 
(-1 21)
0.000 
(-0 07)
0.001 
(0 30 )
-0.04% 
      Day 0 0.025 
(1 42)
0.234 
(1 16)
-0.064 
(-1 28)
0.000 
(0 06)
-0.001 
(-0 49)
-0.01% 
      Day +1 0.023 
(1.93)* 
0.357 
(2.51 )** 
-0.056 
(-1.61 ) 
-0.005 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
( -0.85) 
0.10% 
Model 5c:  LRG_NETBUYi,t = γ0 + γ3FEI/B/E/Si +  γ4CORE_MGREXC    +  γ5SIZEi  + γ6MKTVOLt + ε   
Observation 
Interval  
Intercept (γ0) Coefficient on 
FEI/B/E/Si (γ3) 
Coefficient on 
CORE_MGREXCi (γ4) 
Coefficient on 
SIZEi (γ5) 
Coefficient on 
MKTVOLt (γ6) 
Adjusted-R2 
      Day -1 -0.032 
(-0 85)
0.087 
(0 20)
0.163 
(1 48)
0.007 
(2 31)**
-0.002 
(-0 49)
0.05% 
      Day 0 -0.148 
(-3 13)***
0.095 
(0 17)
0.005 
(0 04)
0.016 
(4 02)***
0.006 
(1 03)
0.24% 
      Day +1 0.030 
(1.22) 
0.177 
(0.60) 
-0.062 
(-0.85) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.73) 
-0.04% 
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1Parameter estimates reported first followed by t-statistics in parentheses 
*   significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
**  significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
***significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
SML_NETBUYi,t = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of small investors (all trades less than or equal to $7,000) on day t relative 
to the earnings announcement date.   
MED_NETBUYi,t = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of medium-sized investors (all trades greater than $7,000 and less than or 
equal to $50,000) on day t relative to the earnings announcement date.   
LRG_NETBUYi,t = Abnormal net-buy volume (buy-volume less sell-volume) of large investors (all trades greater $50,000) on day t relative to the 
earnings announcement date.   
FEI/B/E/Si = Signed forecast error calculated as I/B/E/S actual EPS minus the I/B/E/S mean forecast, scaled by price on day t-5 
CORE_MGREXCi = Managers' incremental adjustments to earnings beyond those made by analysts (calculated as EPSPROFORMA - EPSI/B/E/S).   
SIZEi = The log of total assets in $ millions at the end of the previous quarter 
MKTVOLt = Total market volume of all firms on CRSP on  day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding on day t 
 
